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OSHA ENFORCEMENT OF THE "AS EFFECTIVE AS"
STANDARD FOR STATE PLANS: SERVING PROCESS OR
PEOPLE?
Courtney M. Malveaux *
I. INTRODUCTION
Since the passage of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of
1970 ("OSH Act")' in 1971, the federal Occupational Safety and
Health Administration ("OSHA") has perplexed many states
tasked with its enforcement. Congress passed the OSH Act to na-
tionalize workplace safety and health standards.2 It empowered
OSHA to enforce these standards, either on its own or through an
approved workplace safety and health plan operated by a state
("State Plan").' The OSH Act provides matching funds and over-
sight for states choosing to operate their own programs on the
condition that participating states operate a regime that is "at
least as effective as" that of federal OSHA.'
But contrary to the goals of the OSH Act, OSHA frustrates
states' efforts by imposing process-based requirements, regard-
less of results and despite congressional intent.' Congress did not
intend for OSHA to evaluate the "as effective as" standard
* Commissioner, Virginia Department of Labor and Industry, Richmond, Virginia;
J.D., 2002, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William & Mary; M.A., 1998, George
Washington University; B.A., 1993, Pennsylvania State University. Amanda Blair, W.
Glenn Cox, Kathleen Greene, Elizabeth Southall, and Jay Withrow provided research.
1. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (2006 & Supp. III 2010).
2. S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 1 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5177, 5177.
3. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 655(a), 657-659, 667.
4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 667, 672.
5. See OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN.-OFFICE OF AUDIT, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, REPORT
No. 02-11-201-10-105, OSHA HAS NOT DETERMINED IF STATE OSH PROGRAMS ARE AT
LEAST As EFFECTIVE IN IMPROVING WORKPLACE SAFETY AND HEALTH AS FEDERAL OSHA's
PROGRAMS, at 2-3 (2011) [hereinafter OIG REPORT].
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through process-based criteria, as is demonstrated in the context
of another regulatory law, the Clean Air Act.'
OSHA can restore the original purpose of the OSH Act by shift-
ing toward a results-based analysis of state efforts to preserve
employee safety and health. OSHA needs to rewrite its regula-
tions, ease its focus on internal state processes, and take a fresh
approach to its monitoring of State Plans to embrace the original
meaning of the OSH Act. Despite these and other challenges, Vir-
ginia operates an extremely effective program that can be en-
hanced if OSHA turns its attention toward results.
II. BACKGROUND ON THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH ACT
A. The Purposes of the OSHAct: Achieving Safe and Healthy
Working Conditions
In 1971, growing concerns over workplace injuries, illnesses
and fatalities, and the resulting impact of billions of dollars in
lost productivity led Congress to pass the OSH Act.7 Congress
sought to ensure "safe and healthful working conditions" for
America's workforce and to "preserve our human resources."' To
accomplish this, Congress directed OSHA's Secretary of Labor to
create and apply uniform national standards for occupational
safety and health.'
Observing the varying quality of workplace safety and health
plans already in place throughout the country, Congress declined
to federalize the entire field of occupational safety.o Instead, it
authorized the Secretary of Labor to set mandatory occupational
standards, provide for occupational health and safety research,
and implement effective enforcement programs." States had the
option to continue to assume responsibility for occupational safety
and health by adopting their own State Plans subject to OSHA's
6. Pub. L. No. 95-95, 91 Stat. 685 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671q).
7. H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, at 14 (1970).
8. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
9. S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 1, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5177.
10. See AFL-CIO v. Marshall, 570 F.2d 1030, 1033 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
11. 29 U.S.C. § 651(b).
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oversight.1 2 However, Congress enabled and required the Secre-
tary of Labor to approve State Plans to develop and enforce safety
and health standards that are "at least as effective in providing
safe and healthful employment and places of employment as the
[federal] standards.""
At the time of the OSH Act's passage, Congress observed that
relatively few states had modern occupational safety and health
requirements and those states that had such requirements did
not devote adequate resources to enforce them.14 In addition, the
patchwork of state laws often led to inconsistent results." To
ameliorate this problem, Congress assigned OSHA the role of set-
ting "up to date" standards and protections for the entire nation. 1 6
It reserved a role for states choosing to operate their own plans
("State Plan States") through a grant program." OSHA would
carry out its mandate by working with states in crafting their
own occupational safety and health plans, administering the
grants, and providing oversight." Congress envisioned that this
system would foster federal-state cooperation and assist states in
operating their own occupational safety and health programs.
B. Congress Intended OSHA to Base Its Standards on
Measurable Outcomes
Congress sought results-oriented safety and health standards
that would be embraced by federal OSHA and the State Plan
States alike. For this purpose, it permitted the Secretary of Labor
to adopt "National Consensus Standard[s]" during a two-year
window following the effective date of the OSH Act, unless the
Secretary of Labor determined that a standard did not result in
improved safety or health for employees.2 0 Congress intended that
the Secretary of Labor would look to scientifically measurable cri-
teria, including medical judgment, in developing these stand-
12. Id. § 651(b)(11).
13. Id. § 667(c)(2).
14. S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 4, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5180.
15. See, e.g., id. (discussing differing state laws pertaining to the production of the
coal tar product betanaphthylamine).
16. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5181.
17. Id. at 17, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5195.
18. See 29 U.S.C. § 651(b)(11).
19. See S. REP. NO. 91-1282, at 17, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5195.
20. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5181-82.
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ards." At the time of the OSH Act's inception, however, the lack
of standardized incident reporting meant that OSHA could not
measure states' effectiveness by comparing incident rates alone.22
The standards are revised continually because many of the origi-
nal standards are out-of-date and must be constantly improved
and replaced to embrace new knowledge and techniques.23 Unfor-
tunately, in the forty years since the OSH Act's inception, OSHA
has not yet developed standards to meet its legislative mandate.
III. OSHA UTILIZES PROCESS-BASED MEASURES IN ITS
REGULATIONS AND OVERSIGHT, FRUSTRATING STATE EFFORTS AND
CONTRADICTING LEGISLATIVE INTENT
A. OSHA Uses Procedural Indices in Its Regulations to Measure
State Plan Effectiveness
At a minimum, State Plan States must follow the OSH Act and
OSHA indices. The OSH Act provides a list of criteria that must
be met by a state in the development of its State Plan.24 In its
regulations, OSHA added a set of indices of its own, to ensure
that State Plans are at least "as effective as" the federal pro-
gram." To obtain the approval of the Secretary of Labor to devel-
op and enforce their own safety and health standards, State Plan
21. Id. at 5-6, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5182. This intention is consistent
with the Government Performance and Results Act, which requires the Office of Manage-
ment and Budget to hold federal agencies accountable according to measurable outcomes,
rather than procedures. See generally 5 U.S.C. § 306 (Supp. IV 2011) (outlining require-
ments for annual performance plans); 31 U.S.C. §§ 1115-16 (Supp. III 2010) (outlining re-
quirements for agency strategic plans).
22. H.R. REP. No. 91-1291, at 15. Specifically, Congress pointed out the problems
caused by the lack of a standardized accident and disease reporting which could make
"states with the least effective programs . . appear to have a more favorable accident rec-
ord." Id.; see also Ryder Truck Lines, Inc. v. Brennan, 497 F.2d 230, 233 (5th Cir. 1974)
("It is noteworthy that the [OSH] Act does not establish as a sine qua non any specific
number of accidents or any injury rate.").
23. See S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 6, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5182-83.
24. 29 C.F.R. § 1902.3 (2010).
25. Id. § 1902.3(d)(1) (providing that each "State [P]lan shall provide a program for
the enforcement of the [s]tate standards which is, or will be, at least as effective as that
provided in the Act, and provide assurances that the[s]tate's enforcement program will
continue to be at least as effective as the [flederal program").
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States must use standards" and programs" that are at least "as
effective as" OSHA's.2 8
In providing indices to measure whether State Plan standards
are "as effective as" federal standards, OSHA promulgated regu-
lations that were broad enough to allow flexibility to deal with in-
evitable changes prompted by new industries and work hazards. 9
The indices contain a number of requirements, most of them re-
lating to enforcement procedures, in which the Assistant Secre-
tary of Labor must provide adequate methods to assure that such
standards continue to be "as effective as" federal standards."
Most of the listed indices also pertain to process over results.31
26. S. REP. No. 91-1282, at 17, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5194. The Act re-
quires State Plans to "contain assurances that the state will develop and enforce stand-
ards at least as effective as those developed by the [S]ecretary [of Labor, and], that the
state will have the same legal authority personnel and funds necessary to do the job." Id.
27. Id. at 16, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5194-95. "[T]he plan must.. . estab-
lish and maintain an occupational safety and health program applicable to all employees
of the state and its political subdivisions, and that such program will be as effective as
that applicable to provide employers covered by the plan." Id.
28. Id. at 17, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5195.
29. See, e.g., id.
30. 29 C.F.R. § 1902.4(a) (2010). The indices require the Secretary of Labor to deter-
mine whether State Plans develop standards addressing the hazards of employee exposure
to toxic materials and harmful physical agents. Id. § 1902.4(b). They require procedures
that provide input from interested stakeholders such as employees, employers, standards-
producing organizations, and the public. Id. § 1902.4(b)(2)(iii). They require State Plan
States to provide for variances as necessary and to be ready to set standards promptly
when faced with unforeseen hazards. Id. § 1902.4(b)(2)(iv)-(v). They require State Plan
States to provide for the posting of information on workplace hazards for employees, to
provide for protection of employees from exposure to hazards through protective equip-
ment, and to monitor and measure exposure to hazards. Id. § 1902.4(b)(2)(vi)-(vii).
31. Id. § 1902.4(c). The indices require State Plan States to inspect workplaces to as-
sure safe and healthful working conditions for employees and to allow employees to bring
violations to the attention of enforcing state agencies, under state protection against dis-
charge or discrimination for doing so. Id. § 1902.4(c)(2)(i)-(v). They require State Plan
States to see to it that employees are notified when the enforcing agency does not take
compliance action in response to an employee complaint and that employees are informed
of their protections and obligations under the Act, as well as their exposure to toxic mate-
rials and harmful physical agents. Id. § 1902.4(c)(iii)-(iv), (vi). State Plan States must also
require "prompt restraint or elimination of any conditions or practices ... which could
reasonably be expected to cause death or serious physical harm" through abatement of
such conditions or practices, and they must issue and post citations of violations or other-
wise notify employees and employers of violations of standards. Id. § 1902.4(c)(2)(ii), (x).
Employers are entitled to protections, such as safeguards for trade secrets, and are enti-
tled to a right to review alleged violations, abatement periods, and proposed penalties
through administrative or judicial review or other opportunities for full hearings on these
issues. Id. § 1902.4(c)(2)(viii), (xi). The regulations require State Plan States to augment
their enforcement efforts with voluntary compliance programs. Id. § 1902.4(c)(2)(xiii). Per-
haps the most elusive and controversial requirement is that State Plan States must pro-
vide "effective sanctions against employers who violate [s]tate standards and orders." Id. §
3272011]1
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This contradicts the definition of the term "effective" as
"[p]erforming within the range of normal and expected standards;
[p]roductive; [or] achieving a result."32
B. OSHA Evaluates State Plans Through Inconsistent, Process-
Based Measures, Rather than Measures of Effectiveness in
Achieving Workplace Health and Safety
Rather than focusing on results, OSHA uses procedural
measures to evaluate State Plans. In a recent audit of OSHA's
monitoring of the twenty-seven State Plan States, the Office of
the Inspector General ("OIG") concluded that OSHA has yet to
devise a means to determine whether State Plans are "as effective
as" OSHA." It criticized OSHA's failure to evaluate the impact of
its own enforcement efforts, leaving states without quantifiable
data to demonstrate their own effectiveness by comparison.3 4
In setting its own baselines in federal enforcement states,
OSHA correctly uses criteria which comport with the intended
goals of the Act-Days Away, Restricted, or Transferred ("DART")
rates; and fatality rates." DART data are important because they
measure lost productivity in the workplace, a primary concern
cited in the OSH Act." The OIG also noted that OSHA uses out-
come-based data when evaluating its overall effectiveness in both
State Plan States and federal enforcement states: "injury and ill-
ness data; and fatality data.""
However, OSHA resists the use of this baseline data when as-
sessing State Plan States. Instead, it favors activity-based
measures over outcome-based measures mainly "because outcome
1902.4(c)(2)(xi).
32. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 592 (9th ed. 2009).
33. OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 2.
34. See id. The OIG noted that OSHA does use data, but it does not pertain to out-
comes. See id. Rather, OSHA used "activity-based data including inspection counts, penal-
ty amounts, injury and fatality rate trends, Integrated Management Information System
[] [statistics] and recordkeeping, measures for timeliness and completion of inspections,
violation classification, staffing benchmarks, and timely adoption of standards." Id. It is
noteworthy that OSHA requires states to follow its staffing benchmarks in order to be "as
effective as" OSHA but has no such benchmarks for OSHA's own enforcement. See id. at
7-8.
35. Id. at 7.
36. See id.
37. See id. at 2.
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are lacking."" OSHA points to the fact that DART data are not
available in ten states, though it declines to mention that the ten
states missing the data are federal OSHA states." Second, it
points to states that lack sample sizes large enough to draw sta-
tistical conclusions about workplace injuries and illnesses.40
OSHA also objects to the use of fatalities as a measure of effec-
tiveness because of their unpredictability, and because the rise or
fall in this number could be attributed in part to rising or falling
unemployment numbers." Nevertheless, OSHA declines to
demonstrate that these inherent dangers do not exist in the data
it uses to evaluate its own program.
Further, when it comes to assessing states, OSHA protests the
use of outcome-based measures exclusively because it finds them
"extremely problematic," and because, in OSHA's view, they con-
found the purposes of the OSH Act.42 Therefore, process is now a
primary driver for OSHA. Rather than setting its own consistent,
outcome-based criteria for effectiveness, which would address the
core purpose of the OSH Act in reducing or eliminating injuries,
illnesses, and fatalities, OSHA uses activity-based measures to
evaluate State Plans and relies on State Plan States to define ef-
fectiveness in their own contexts.
38. Id.
39. Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Workplace Injuries
and Illness-2009 (Oct. 21, 2010) (on file with author).
40. OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 7.
41. Id. With respect to the former, OSHA's concern may have been with employers
self-reporting. Memorandum from David Michaels, Assistant Sec'y, Occupational Safety &
Health Admin., to Elliot P. Lewis, Assistant Inspector Gen. for Audit, Office of Inspector
Gen. 4 (Mar. 31, 2011) (on file with author).
42. See id. at 1-2.
43. OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 2; Changes to State Plans: Revision of Process for
Submission, Review and Approval of State Plan Changes, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,122, 60,123
(Sept. 25, 2002) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1902, 1952-55.) [hereinafter Changes to
State Plans]. In response to the Government Performance and Results Act of 1993, OSHA
was forced to begin looking at outcome-based measures for itself and for State Plans:
"Over the years, OSHA's monitoring has changed from a system of measuring the states
against [flederal performance on various indicators to the current reviews that measure
state performance against the state's own goals." OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 8. Howev-
er, the Obama administration still relies heavily on activity measures and, in the recent
Enhanced Federal Annual Monitoring and Evaluation effort in 2011, reverted dramatical-
ly to focusing on activities rather than performance-based outcomes. Is OSHA Undermin-
ing State Efforts to Promote Workplace Safety?: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. on Work-
force Prot., 112th Cong. 15 (2011) (prepared statement of Elliott P. Lewis, Assistant
Inspector General for Audit, U.S. Department of Labor) [hereinafter Is OSHA Undermin-
ing State Efforts Hearing].
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The result is as ironic as it is sad: "OSHA lacks the clear un-
derstanding of the impact of State [Plan] programs on safety and
health."44 The experience has left most State Plan States in
agreement that "OSHA's effectiveness measures need to be re-
evaluated and more outcome, rather than, output-oriented."45
Despite these alleged flaws, a comparative study of the afore-
mentioned data between federal OSHA enforcement and State
Plans should provide a comparison between the two enforcement
regimes on a level playing field. It is through such a comparison
that OSHA can work with State Plan States to determine if they
are "as effective as" OSHA.
C. OSHA Leaves State Plan States Guessing How to Implement
the "As Effective As" Standard
In establishing indices for evaluating State Plans, the Secre-
tary of Labor uses case-by-case, process-based criteria to assess
the effectiveness of State Plans, leaving State Plan States with-
out suitable guidance about how to create a program that embod-
ies the goals of the OSH Act.4 6 Peter DeLuca, Administrator of the
Oregon Occupational Safety and Health Division, submitted a
comment to the proposed 2002 amendments citing the need to
clarify the "as effective as" language.4 7 He pointed out that the
"lack of clarity around 'at least as effective as' only stifles and dis-
courages creativity" in State Plan States and restricts State Plan
States' ability to find new ways to enhance workplace safety and
health.
In response to DeLuca's concerns, OSHA declined to clarify "as
effective as," stating that it would be impracticable and inadvisa-
ble to create a "one size fits all" definition for the varied State
Plans.49 Rather than developing a multivariate scheme or other
tool to measure effectiveness across states, OSHA re-delegated
44. OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 8.
45. Id. at 13 exh.1.
46. See id. at 4.
47. See Changes to State Plans, supra note 43, at 60, 122.
48. Id. at 60, 123.
49. See id.
330 [Vol. 46:323
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State Plan oversight to the states themselves, based on each
state's own criteria.
OSHA's decision to leave the "as effective as" language unde-
fined frustrates a major purpose of the statute and places the
burden of determining effectiveness on the Secretary of Labor." It
cannot be denied that states have a variety of industrial mixes
that alter the makeup of the challenges each faces, or that no two
states face the same challenges. Some states may well have a sig-
nificantly higher prevalence of high-hazard industries, while oth-
ers may be blessed with relatively safe industry profiles. Despite
these inevitable variances, however, to evaluate each state's pro-
cesses individually, without measuring their outcomes, leaves
state enforcers guessing how to meet OSHA's approval and tends
to stifle and discourage State Plan States' creativity.
D. OSHA's Process-Based Measures Contradict Legislative Intent
While OSHA declined to adopt a "one size fits all" means to
evaluate State Plan effectiveness,52 it embraced this approach
with its National Emphasis Programs ("NEP"). Under NEPs,
OSHA focuses inspection resources on particularly hazardous in-
dustries." For the first forty years of the OSH Act, OSHA gave
State Plan States the option to participate." State Plan States did
participate in NEPs quite frequently to address hazards such as
combustible dust explosions.
50. See id. To wit, OSHA stated that it leaves to each state
the initial determination as to whether a particular requirement is "at least
as effective as" at the time it adopts and begins to enforce the new require-
ment, and if OSHA disagrees, it must institute an adjudicatory rejection pro-
ceeding in which the burden of proof rests with OSHA, not the [s]tate.
Id.
51. See 29 U.S.C. § 675(c)(2) (2006).
52. Changes to State Plans, supra note 43, at 60, 123.
53. See, e.g., Letter from Kevin Beauregard, Chair, Occupational Safety & Health
State Plan. Ass'n, to David Michaels, Assistant Sec'y for Occupational Safety & Health,
U.S. Dep't of Labor 1 (May 13, 2001) (on file with author) [hereinafter OSHSPA May 13th
Memo].
54. See OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 1.
55. Federal Program Change Summary Report: Combustible Dust National Emphasis
Program, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. (Oct. 15, 2008), http://www.osha.gov/
dcsp/osp/standards-fpc/fpc-cpL03 00_008.html (indicating that fifteen State Plan States
intended to adopt the combustible dust NEP and that, as of October 15, 2008, eleven of
those states had formally adopted the NEP).
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In 2010, the Obama administration decided to mandate State
Plan adoption of all future NEPs." Now State Plans must conduct
up to five inspections in each targeted industry each year." OSHA
mandates five inspections in each state, regardless of the size of
the state, the number (or even the existence) of employers in such
industries in each state, and the number (or absence) of fatalities,
injuries, or missed workdays in such industries." However,
OSHA does not provide states with additional funding to carry
out these mandates."
The Occupational Safety and Health State Plan Association
("OSHSPA"), an organization representing the twenty-seven
State Plan States, took issue with "OSHA's position that a State
56. See Is OSHA Undermining State Efforts Hearing, supra note 43, at 38 (written
statement of Kevin Beauregard, Chair, Occupational Safety & Health State Plan Associa-
tion); accord Nev.'s Workplace Safety & Health Enforcement Program: OSHA's Findings &
Recommendations: Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Educ. & Labor, 111th Cong. 22 (2010)
(prepared statement of Jordan Barab, Assistant Secretary for Occupational Safety &
Health, U.S. Department of Labor) (announcing the Obama administration's plan to make
all future OSHA NEPs mandatory for state programs). OSHSPA challenged the mandate
on the grounds that there was no legal basis for requiring State Plans to adopt all future
NEPs. See Memorandum from Kevin Beauregard, Chair, Occupational Safety & Health
State Plan Ass'n, to David Michaels, Assistant Sec'y, Occupational Safety & Health Ad-
min., U.S. Dep't of Labor 1 (July 6, 2010) (on file with author) [hereinafter OSHSPA July
6th Memo]. Assistant Secretary Michaels responded by citing the OSH Act's requirement
that State Plans be "at least as effective" as those of federal OSHA. Memorandum from
David Michaels, Assistant Sec'y, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., U.S. Dep't of La-
bor, to Kevin Beauregard, Chair, Occupational Safety & Health State Plan Ass'n 1 (Oct.
12, 2010) (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1902.3(d)(1) (2010)) (on file with author). He stated that
[t]o carry out this requirement, OSHA regulations provide that whenever "a
significant change in the [fjederal program would have an adverse effect on
the 'at least as effective as' status of the State [PIlan if a parallel [s]tate
change were not made," a [sitate change "shall be required." A change in
OSHA "policy or procedure of national importance" is an example of such a
[flederal program change requiring [s]tate action.
Id. (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1953.4(b)(1)-(2) (2010)). Because OSHA's adoption of an NEP is "a
change in policy or procedure of national importance," when so notified, State Plans are
required to respond." Id. at 2 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1953.4(b)(2) (2010)).
57. See, e.g., OSHSPA May 13th Memo, supra note 53, at 2.
58. See id. at 2-3 (showing that under the mandate, State Plans will be required to
use their limited resources to address hazards that may not be problems in a particular
state); OSHSPA July 6th Memo, supra note 56, at 1 ("A [s]tate strategic plan often in-
cludes statewide emphasis programs specific to prevalent industries . . . within an indi-
vidual state that are accounting for the highest rates of . .. serious accidents. Requiring
State Plans to adopt NEPs developed solely by OSHA could divert limited state resources
from these critical areas . . ").
59. See OSHSPA May 13th, Memo, supra note 53, at 3. Because Virginia provides half
of the funding for VOSH, NEPs implementation serves not only as an unfunded mandate
but also as a federal mandate on how state funds are to be utilized. Id.
332 [Vol. 46:323
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Plan should use its limited resources to address a hazard that
may be a problem elsewhere in the nation, but is not [a problem]
in a particular [s]tate."" Further, it objected to "federal micro-
management of [s]tate resources" via the five-inspection require-
ment because it "runs directly contrary to Congress's stated in-
tent for the [s]tates to identify their own needs and responsibili-
ties for assuring 'safe and healthful working conditions' in their
[s]tate."" OSHSPA pointed out that these provisions hold even if
a state can achieve safety and health outcomes through coopera-
tive programs, rather than through enforcement.62 The state
would have to comply "even if the [s]tate could demonstrate that
previous enforcement and consultation inspections in the particu-
lar industry or emphasis area in their [s]tate resulted in high in-
compliance rates and/or a low percent-serious rate."6 OSHSPA
found these positions to be "unsupportable."6 4 Further, it found
them "contrary to Congress's stated intent that State Plans 'con-
duct experimental and demonstration projects' to address work-
place hazards.""
Another example of the negative impact OSHA can have on
State Plans occurred with its implementation of an NEP on
recordkeeping, which was based on OSHA's perception that em-
ployers were intentionally underreporting injuries and illnesses."
Initially, when OSHA issued this NEP on February 19, 2010, it
developed the initiative "without any State Plan participation
early enough in the development process to identify any negative
60. See id.; see also OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., FED. ANNUAL
MONITORING & EVALUATION (FAME) REPORT ON VA. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
PROGRAM: OCT. 1, 2008 TO SEPT. 30, 2009, at 7 (2010) [hereinafter APRIL 30TH FAME
REPORT]).
61. See OSHSPA May 13th Memo, supra note 53, at 2.
62. See id. OSHA offers programs to assist employers in complying with its health and
safety regulations. OSHA's On-Site Consultation Program, for example, provides free
workplace safety evaluations to small businesses. On-Site Consultation, OCCUPATIONAL
SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., http://www.oshagov/dcsp/smallbusiness/consult.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 12, 2011). The program is independent from OSHA's enforcement program and
work site visits do not result in penalties or citations. Id.
63. OSHSPA May 13th Memo, supra note 53, at 3.
64. Id.
65. Id. (citation omitted).
66. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. DIRECTIVE No. 10-07 (CPL 02), INJURY
AND ILLNESS RECORDKEEPING NAT'L EMPHASIS PROGRAM, Exec. Summary, Abstract-3
(Sept. 28, 2010). OSHA focused on "establishments operating in historically high rate in-
dustries and reporting injury and illness rates slightly lower than the cut-off rates used by
OSHA to compile its primary inspection targeting list under the Site-Specific Targeting []
program." Id.
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resource impacts on State Plan programs in time to address them
up front."67 The results of the NEP, in the absence of state in-
volvement, were underwhelming. The initial NEP did not show
the number of underreported violations cited and "not-in-
compliance" inspections." In a follow-up NEP, OSHA had to re-
vise the inspection targeting criteria in order to include more es-
tablishments in violation of the recordkeeping regulations to sup-
port its hypothesis.6 9
OSHA further exacerbates state concerns with the criteria used
in its Federal Annual Monitoring and Evaluation ("FAME") re-
ports. The FAME reports are OSHA's formal mechanism to eval-
uate the effectiveness of each State Plan and to provide State
Plan States with OSHA's criteria for the continued delegation of
OSHA's enforcement duties."o In these reports, OSHA evaluates
data such as the number of hazards located and the percentages
of identified hazards that inspectors deem "serious," "other-than-
serious," "willful," or "repeat."" Counterintuitively, OSHA con-
cludes that inspections uncovering compliant employers do not
signify safe workplaces, but inadequate inspection targeting sys-
tems.72 On the other hand, in federal enforcement states, OSHA
67. OSHSPA May 13th Memo, supra note 53, at 3; see also OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY &
HEALTH ADMIN. DIRECTIVE No. 10-02 (CPL 02), INJURY & ILLNESS RECORDKEEPING NAT'L
EMPHASIS PROGRAM, Exec. Summary, Abstract-3 (Feb. 19, 2010). OSHA received an ap-
propriation of approximately $2 million for this initiative but allocated none of the addi-
tional funding to assist the twenty-seven State Plan States that invested hundreds to
thousands of hours in compliance efforts, a result that "could constitute an unfunded
mandate to State Plans." OSHSPA May 13th Memo, supra note 53, at 3.
68. See Sara Ditta, OSHA Fails to Find 'Bad Actors' in Recordkeeping NEP, Suspends
Program, INSIDEOSHAONLINE.com (Aug. 4, 2010), http://insideoshaonline.com/OSHA-
Online-Daily-NEWS/OSHA-Daily/osha-fails-to-find-bad-actors-in-recordkeeping-nep-susp
ends-program/menu-id-622.html.
69. See Is OSHA Undermining State Efforts Hearing, supra note 43, at 38 (written
statement of Kevin Beauregard, Chair, Occupational Safety & Health State Plan Associa-
tion).
70. Memorandum from Lee Anne Jillings, Acting Dir. for Directorate of Coop. & State
Programs, Occupational Safety & Health Admin., to Reg'l Adm'rs, Occupational Safety &
Health Admin. (Jan. 10, 2011) (on file with author) [hereinafter Jillings Memo].
71. APRIL 30TH FAME REPORT, supra note 60, at 21-22. In these reports, OSHA eval-
uates State Plans according to in-compliance rates, not-in-compliance rates, percentages of
serious violation rates; percentage of programmed inspections with serious, willful, or re-
peat violations; and numbers of violations found per inspection. OSHSPA May 13th Memo,
supra note 53, at 3.
72. See OSHSPA May 13th Memo, supra note 53, at 3. ("OSHSPA can provide count-
less examples of State Plan annual evaluation reports where OSHA monitoring personnel
have used such indicators as high in-compliance rates and low percent serious violation
rates in planned inspections to conclude that a state's targeting system was inadequate or
not 'as effective as' OSHA's targeting system.").
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views a similar decline in a more positive light. In its own strate-
gic plan for 2011-2016, OSHA projects that its performance indi-
cator for "[p]ercent of serious, willful, repeat violations in . . .
[1]arge construction projects [and] [h]igh-hazard manufacturing
industry" is "targeted to trend downward" in 2016.7 Apparently, a
quantum indicating ineffectiveness in State Plans is a goal when
it is applied to OSHA.
As its next step, OSHA is considering additional constraints on
State Plans by requiring them to follow its Severe Violators En-
forcement Program ("SVEP"). OSHA launched this proposal in
June 2010 to increase enforcement efforts in cases involving "sig-
nificant hazards and violations by concentrating on employers
who have demonstrated indifference to their occupational safety
and health obligations through willful, repeated, or failure-to-
abate violations."" The SVEP proposal applies to situations in-
volving fatalities, catastrophes, "[h]igh- [e]mphasis [h]azards,"
and other severe occupational hazards, hazardous chemicals, and
egregious violations."
SVEP includes more mandatory inspections and follow-up in-
spections of identified companies, inspections at multiple loca-
tions of companies that have them, more intense examination of
employers' history, and penalty increases.7 6 Preliminary data
suggest that this initiative may increase the rate of contested ci-
tations .
73. HILDA L. SOLIS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, STRATEGIC PLAN: FISCAL YEARS 2011-2016
at 44 (2010).
74. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN. DIRECTIVE No. CPL 02-00-149, SEVERE
VIOLATOR ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM (June 18, 2010), available at http://www.osha.gov/pls/
oshaweb/owadisp.show document?p.table=DIRECTIVES&pid=4503.
75. Id.
76. See Putting Safety First: Strengthening Enforcement and Creating a Culture of
Compliance at Mines and Other Dangerous Workplaces, Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Health, Educ., Labor, & Pensions, 111th Cong. 132-33 (2010) (statement of David
Michaels, Assistant Secretary, Occupational Safety and Health Admin.); Press Release,
U.S. Dep't of Labor, U.S. Dep't of Labor's OSHA Takes Action to Protect America's Work-
ers with Severe Violator Program and Increased Penalties (Apr. 22, 2010), available at
http://osha.gov/pls/oshaweb/owadisp.show document?p table=NEWSRELEASES&pid=
17544 (signaling an intent to increase penalties for serious violations from $1000 to up to
$4000).
77. Marcus Baram, Swatting at Flies: Another Huge Company Fights a Small Fine
over Safety Violations, HUFFPOST Bus. (May 20, 2011, 5:05 PM), http://www.huffington
post.com/2011/05/20/big-company-fights-small-fine_n_864756.html ("More companies seem
to be disputing [OSHA] penalties. . . . Since 2008, the number of new cases heard by the
[U.S. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission ("OSHRC")] has nearly doubled
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OSHA has not yet determined whether State Plans will have to
increase penalties by the same or similar amounts. But it already
measures State Plan effectiveness in part through penalty levels
and identifies violations without demonstrating how those
measures translate into effectiveness." Such indices include the
average number of violations per inspection. 9 While an effective
State Plan may demonstrate a higher number of identified viola-
tions, an effective regime may also deter such violations in the
first place, thus yielding lower numbers.o Such a measure can
vary from one industry to the next. OSHA also computes the av-
erage initial penalty per serious violation among private sector
employers, but it does not provide empirical data to demonstrate
that lower penalties would fail to deter violations.81 On the other
hand, in OSHA-run states, preliminary data indicates that re-
cently enhanced penalties may be increasing legal contests. Un-
der the OSH Act, legal challenges stay required abatement until
they are resolved.8 2 Third, OSHA computes average penalties for
serious safety and health violations by private sector employers."
Again, OSHA has not demonstrated the effect of higher or lower
penalty levels on employee safety or health.
Ironically, such a mandate could render State Plans less effec-
tive in reducing injuries or illnesses. If, in fact, legal challenges
increase as they currently appear to be, they would stay required
from [thirteen] to [twenty-four] in 2010."); see also U.S. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH
REVIEW COMM'N, FY 2010 PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY REPORT 6-7 (2010) [hereinaf-
ter OSHRC REPORT]. The workload of OSHRC administrative law judges has dramatically
increased as a result of contested OSHA penalties. See, e.g., OSHRC REPORT, supra at 6
(noting that in FY 2010, the workload of administrative law judges has increased substan-
tially over prior FYs and included a 60% increase in the number of cases disposed of with
hearings).
78. See OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 5-6.
79. See, e.g., id. at 15 exh.2.
80. See APRIL 30TH FAME REPORT, supra note 60, at 26. However, OSHA appears to
assume the former over the latter. To wit,
Virginia conducted 2,474 programmed inspections during FY 2009 with an
average of 2.9 violations per inspection compared to [fjederal OSHA's 3.1 vio-
lations per inspection. Virginia's serious/willful/repeat rate was 65% com-
pared to [flederal OSHA's rate of 81%. While there appears to be a significant
difference between Virginia's rate and [flederal OSHA, the total [S]tate
[P]lan rate is 44 % so Virginia appears to be performing an adequate job in
the classification of its violations.
Id.
81. See OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 16.
82. See 29 U.S.C. § 659(C) (2010).
83. OIG REPORT, supra note 5, at 16.
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abatement of workplace hazards while legal contests are pend-
ing." Increased legal challenges would also force cash-strapped
states to divert funds from inspection positions and other health
and safety-related positions to hire more attorneys to handle the
caseload." Virginia Occupational Safety and Health ("VOSH")
staff members have observed that SVEP has led to increased hos-
tility among employers who are resisting heavy-handed enforce-
ment during inspections, particularly small employers who are
less able to afford higher penalties." In addition, OSHA may
cause problems for small employers in economically depressed ar-
eas, when more cooperative measures or reduced penalties may
encourage quick abatement.
IV. DESPITE OSHA's PROCESS-BASED REQUIREMENTS, VIRGINIA
ACHIEVES MEASURABLE OUTCOMES IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH
When OSHA does evaluate State Plans, it offers recommenda-
tions that overwhelmingly relate to process, such as OSHA-
approved file documentation, rather than results. Often, OSHA's
"major" findings of fault in a State Plan are erroneous or insignif-
icant." Rather than enhancing workplace safety and health in
84. See VA. DEP'T OF LABOR AND INDUS., OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH FIELD
OPERATIONS MANUAL ch. 11, at 24 (2001) [hereinafter VOSH FOM] (noting that the period
for abatement of contested violations does not begin to run until the day following a court
order).
85. Apparently, increased penalties are causing an unexpected flood of legal challeng-
es today in a similar context, federal enforcement of mining violations. Reducing the Grow-
ing Backlog of Contested Mine Safety Cases, COMM. ON EDUC. & THE WORKFORCE (Feb. 23,
2010), http://democrats.edworkforce.house.gov/hearing/reducing-growing-backlog-contest
ed-mine-safety-cases.shtml ("As the result of stepped-up enforcement and tougher penal-
ties after a spate of mine tragedies in 2005 and 2006, mine owners tripled the number of
violations they appeal and are now litigating 67[%] of all penalties.").
86. VOSH is Virginia's OSHA-approved occupational safety and health State Plan.
87. See generally APRIL 30TH FAME REPORT, supra note 60, at 24-33. For example,
despite OSHA's finding that VOSH was responding to and investigating complaints in a
timely manner, OSHA issued VOSH a recommendation stating: "Written documentation
should be contained in case files to justify why a non-formal complaint resulted in an in-
spection." Id. at 24. Additionally, OSHA commended VOSH for its prompt and thorough
investigation of job-related fatalities but found that documentation of such incidents need-
ed improvement. Id. at 24-25. OSHA issued VOSH a recommendation to that effect: "En-
sure that interviews with employer representatives and employees [regarding job-related
fatalities] are documented in case files." Id. at 26.
88. See, e.g., Letter from Courtney Malveaux, Comm'r, Va. Dep't of Labor & Indus., to
John M. Hermanson, Reg'l Admin., U.S. Dep't of Labor-Occupational Safety & Health
Admin. (Oct. 14, 2010), available at http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/efame/va-formal-respon
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Virginia, this system requires VOSH to expend considerable time
and resources on procedural issues, to its detriment. In fact,
many State Plan States spend hundreds or thousands of staff
hours on complying with OSHA's recordkeeping NEP, diverting
critical resources from enforcement efforts." Currently, signifi-
cant VOSH staff time that could be spent finding creative ways to
enhance occupational safety and health is devoted to FAME re-
ports, OSHA audits, authoring letters to industry participants in
industries targeted by OSHA, and other tasks required by OSHA.
Despite these distractions, VOSH has demonstrated marked
success in worker safety and health that certainly has contribut-
ed to a steady decrease each year in fatal accidents investigated
by VOSH between 2005 and 2009, culminating in a 48% decrease
over a five-year period. 90 VOSH continues to maintain injury and
illness rates that fall consistently well below the national aver-
91
age.
VOSH points to a number of factors for its successes. It may
have averted potential fatalities, injuries, and illnesses through
its unique and well-tailored regulations.9 2 Over the years, VOSH
has enacted additional unique regulations in the areas of confined
space hazards in the construction and telecommunications indus-
tries;9 3 overhead high voltage line safety;94 fall protection in steel
erection;95 reverse signal operation in construction and general
se.pdf [hereinafter Malveaux letter]. For example, OSHA issued the following recommen-
dation: "Bulk samples should be taken by industrial hygienists whenever suspected com-
bustible dust is encountered in a work place." APRIL 30TH FAME REPORT, supra note 60,
at 28. In its corrective action plan response to the Enhanced Federal Annual Monitoring
Report, VOSH stated: "This error was found in 1 of 102 case files. VOSH does not consider
a less than [1%] error rate to rise to the level of a serious problem. This issue will be ad-
dressed at the annual VOSH training conference for [Compliance Safety and Health Offic-
ers] in 2011." Malveaux Letter, supra at 7.
89. OSHSPA May 13th Memo, supra note 53, at 3.
90. Malveaux Letter, supra note 88, at 2. According to its internal records, VOSH re-
ceived reports of sixty-four fatalities in 2005, fifty-five fatalities in 2006, forty-five fatali-
ties in 2007, thirty-nine fatalities in 2008, thirty-three fatalities in 2009, and twenty-four
fatalities in 2010. Id.; VA. DEP'T OF LABOR & INDUS., VOSH FATALITIES-2010 (2010) (on
file with author). As of September 7, VOSH has received reports of twenty-four fatalities
in 2011. VA. DEP'T OF LABOR & INDUS., VOSH FATALITIES-2011 (2011) (on file with au-
thor).
91. APRIL 30TH FAME REPORT, supra note 60, at 8; Malveaux Letter, supra note 88,
at 2.
92. See Malveaux Letter, supra note 88, at 2.
93. 16 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 25-70-10 (1996).
94. Id. § 25-145-10 (Cum. Supp. 2011).
95. Id. § 25-145-20 (Cum. Supp. 2011).
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industry;" and compliance with manufacturers' instructions for
vehicles, machinery, tools, and equipment.97 VOSH also made
Virginia an exemplar of vigilance, as one of the top states in the
rate of occupational safety and health inspections performed per
number of employers and a top state in overall on-time complaint
responses." Additionally, VOSH built a comparatively robust
Voluntary Protection Program ("VPP") and a Safety and Health
Achievement and Recognition Program ("SHARP"), which re-
cruited forty-three member employers and thirty-eight member
employers respectively to serve as leaders in workplace health
and safety.99 Finally, VOSH has held safety and health confer-
ences over the past sixteen years to give participants in high-
hazard industries, consultants, employers, contractors, and other
stakeholders an opportunity to share best practices and mutual
expectations. 00
An increased ability to focus on outcomes over process may free
VOSH to expend staff time and resources in creative ways to en-
hance occupational safety and health. For example, VOSH is
looking at broadcasting public service announcements on televi-
sion, radio, and in new media to educate employees and employ-
ers on recurring hazards. Well-timed and aggressive public edu-
cation campaigns addressing hazards such as high overhead
voltage lines, trenches and excavation, and heat and fall protec-
tion could prevent fatalities. VOSH is also looking at replacing
the general inspection list it receives from OSHA with data on
identified workplace injuries from the Virginia Workers' Compen-
sation Commission. Currently, the OSHA general inspection list
points VOSH inspectors to closed businesses or worksites that no
longer exist. These inspectors could be spending their time (and
state-paid gasoline and vehicle wear and tear) traveling to
worksites that exist, and where employees are actually getting
hurt. In addition, more VOSH staff could devote their time to
96. Id. § 25-97-30 (Cum. Supp. 2011).
97. Id. § 25-60-120 (Cum. Supp. 2011); see also Malveaux Letter, supra note 89, at 2.
98. Malveaux Letter, supra note 88, at 2; see also APRIL 30TH FAME REPORT, supra
note 60, at 23-24 (indicating that during the period from October 1, 2008 to September 30,
2009, Virginia had a response rate of 99.73%).
99. Malveaux Letter, supra note 88, at 2; see also April 30th FAME REPORT, supra
note 60, at 44. Virginia is unique in that it is the only state that has certified correctional
facilities in VPP. Id. at 8.
100. See VA. DEP'T OF LABOR & INDUS., 16th ANNUAL VIRGINIA OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY
AND HEALTH CONFERENCE (2011).
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consultations that help employers proactively address workplace
hazards. They could also assist more in certifications for employ-
ers striving to become exemplars in workplace safety and health
in Virginia's VPP or SHARP programs. Finally, VOSH staff could
spend more time hosting public outreach events to educate em-
ployees and employers in targeted industries and geographic are-
as on the most common hazards VOSH encounters.
Currently, however, VOSH staff devote significant time and re-
sources to meetings and reports dealing with the procedural is-
sues raised by OSHA's audits, as well as complying with NEPs of
debatable value in Virginia's industry mix. The creative minds on
VOSH's staff could be turned loose on initiatives, such as those
mentioned above, in order to find new ways to cooperate with
employers and prevent workplace incidents. OSHA may be pleas-
antly surprised at the ways VOSH could produce even better out-
comes, if given more flexibility to explore ways to save lives and
simultaneously conserve resources.
V. OSHA CAN USE THE CLEAN AIR ACT AND STATE PLAN
INITIATIVE TO MOVE TOWARD OUTCOME-BASED MEASURES
A. OSHA Can Look to the Clean Air Act as an Example in
Utilizing Outcome-Based Measures
The term "as effective as" is used in other federal regulatory
contexts, but not generally in the context of shared state-federal
regulatory regimes.101 But the term is used in such a context in
the National Ambient Air Quality Standards ("NAAQS") of the
federal Clean Air Act.'02 These standards set maximum concen-
tration levels for specific pollutants.'0 3 They are harm-based
standards that do not measure the amount of pollutants that
emerge from a source, like a specific smoke stack, but rather the
level of pollutants in an entire region's air quality that affects
health outcomes.0 4
101. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2006) (equal opportunity regulation); 46 U.S.C. §
3703a (2006) (shipping vessel construction); 46 U.S.C. § 55105 (2010) (shipping hazardous
waste); 9 C.F.R. § 113.450 (2011) (Department of Agriculture); 12 C.F.R. § 215.8 (2011)
(Federal Reserve); 46 C.F.R. § 163.002-9 (2010) (Coast Guard).
102. 40 C.F.R. § 51.908 (2010).
103. See id. § 50.2(b).
104. See id. § 50.1(e) (defining "ambient air" as "that portion of the atmosphere, exter-
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The Clean Air Act provides states with grants and authority to
enforce the NAAQS under a State Implementation Plan ("SIP").105
Participating states measure and enforce requisite levels of pollu-
tants in order to safeguard public safety.106 Rather than focusing
on process, SIP leverages federal resources, so states can use
technology-based standards that focus on measurable outcomes
for health and air quality for entire communities.
Under the Clean Air Act, participating states must demon-
strate that their measures, rules, and regulations are "at least as
effective" as the national standards they implement.10 ' In demon-
strating that its program is at least as effective as federal efforts,
a participating state must measure emissions."'
This is not to say that the SIP program does not encounter
problems similar to those highlighted by the Department of La-
bor. In fact, each enforcing state has different challenges. There-
fore, expert vigilance is necessary to supplement the outcome-
based criteria.o' Despite these challenges, the program requires
enforcing states to operate a program "at least as effective" as
that of the federal regulatory agency."'0 It holds each state ac-
countable to outcomes that measure the impact of industry on
public safety."' This result is consistent with the definition of "ef-
nal to buildings, to which the general public has access"); see also ENVTL. LAW INST.,
OPPORTUNITIES FOR ADVANCING ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE: AN ANALYSIS OF U.S. EPA
STATUTORY AUTHORITIES 9 (2001) (discussing the provisions under NAAQS as "harm-
based" standards).
105. 42 U.S.C. § 7410 (2006).
106. See 40 C.F.R. § 7410; 40 C.F.R. § 51.112(a) (2010).
107. See id. § 51.908(c) (2010).
108. Id. § 51.112(a)-(b).
109. Id. § 51 app. W.
It would be advantageous to categorize the various regulatory programs and
to apply a designated model to each proposed source needing analysis under a
given program. However, the diversity of the nation's topography and cli-
mate, and variations in source configurations and operating characteristics
dictate against a strict modeling "cookbook." There is no one model capable of
properly addressing all conceivable situations even within a broad category
such as point sources. Meteorological phenomena associated with threats to
air quality standards are rarely amenable to a single mathematical treat-
ment; thus, case-by-case analysis and judgment are frequently required . . . .
The judgment of experienced meteorologists and analysts is essential.
Id.
110. See id. § 51.908.
111. See id. § 51.112.
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fective" as "[p]erforming within the range of normal and expected
standards [p]roductive; [or] achieving a result."112
B. OSHA Can Use an Enhanced Abatement Verification Process,
Such as Virginia's, to Evaluate and Enhance State Plan
Effectiveness
One way OSHA could evaluate and enhance effectiveness
would be to require abatement verification in a manner similar to
the VOSH program. OSHA requires State Plans to verify that
hazards have been eliminated or "abated" through "abatement
certification, documents, plans and progress reports." 3 The
OSHA Field Operations Manual requires abatement certification
to include the receipt of certain abatement documents from an
employer with information indicating that the subject hazards
have been eliminated such as "photographic or video evidence."'14
OSHA generally requires abatement documentation only for
"high gravity serious violations.""' Likewise, it generally does not
require abatement documentation for "[m]oderate or low gravity
serious violations.""6 The OSHA area director has some discretion
in these determinations, particularly if he or she chooses to re-
quire abatement documentation for moderate or low gravity seri-
ous violations in which the establishment had previously been
cited "for a willful violation or a failure-to-abate notice . . . in the
previous three years; or [] [i]f the employer has [a] history of a vi-
olation [causing] a fatality or . .. serious [bodily] harm to an em-
ployee in the [previous] three years.""' OSHA's abatement verifi-
cation does not require a health or safety inspector to verify
abatement through a follow-up visit or through direct visual evi-
dence by photograph or otherwise."8
112. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 32, at 592.
113. OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY & HEALTH ADMIN., OSHA's FIELD OPERATIONS MANUAL
(FOM) ch. 7, at 7 (2011) [hereinafter OSHA FOM].
114. Id.
115. See id. ch. 7, at 14.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. See id. ch. 7, at 11. ("Where necessary, OSHA supplements these [verification]
procedures with follow-up inspections and on-site monitoring inspections.").
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VOSH, on the other hand, provides that "all willful and repeat
citations require abatement verification (certification and docu-
mentation), such as written, videographic or photographic evi-
dence of abatement.""' Therefore, VOSH expands the universe of
OSHA violations requiring verification to include "willful" and
"repeat" violations, regardless of whether they are deemed "high
gravity serious."20
C. OSHA Can Alleviate State Confusion and Align with
Legislative Intent by Using More Outcome-Based Measures to
Define "As Effective As"
OSHA acknowledges that it needs to reform how it measures
State Plan effectiveness and, in fact, has opened conversations
with OSHSPA to do so.121 Fortunately, OSHA does not entirely
lack indicia to determine State Plan effectiveness. Some of them
do measure the efficiency of safety and health inspections. For
example, OSHA measures the average number of days a State
Plan takes to initiate an inspection and an investigation upon re-
ceipt of a complaint, which encourages diligence in state investi-
gators.122 OSHA also measures the number of inspections com-
pleted per hundred hours worked by each safety and health
inspector.1 23 It also computes the percentage of complaint investi-
gations completed within one day of receipt of a complaint and
within five days of receipt of a complaint,124 as well as the average
numbers of days from the opening conference of an investigation
to citation issuance.'2 5 OSHA also looks at the average time lapse
119. VOSH FOM, supra note 85, ch. 13, at 6.
120. Compare OSHA FOM, supra note 115, ch. 7, at 14 ("Moderate or low gravity seri-
ous violations should not normally require abatement documentation . . . ."), with VOSH
FOM, supra note 85, ch. 13, at 6 ("VOSH policy is that all serious violations, including
moderate and low gravity violations, will require abatement documentation.").
121. See Memorandum from Jordan Barab, Acting Assistant Sec'y, Occupational Safety
& Health Admin., to Reg'l Adm'rs, Occupational Safety & Health Admin. (Nov. 24, 2009)
(on file with author); see also Jillings Memo, supra note 70.
122. See, e.g., APRIL 30TH FAME REPORT, supra note 60, at app. D.
123. Id. at app. E.
124. U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMIN., IMIS REPORT:
VIRGINIA 1 (Oct. 3, 2010).
125. APRIL 30TH FAME REPORT, supra note 60, at app. D.
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from receipt of a contest to a first-level decision by the State
Plan, a good measure of the efficiency of the judicial process.
There are many ways OSHA can overcome the challenges it
faces in quantifying effectiveness. One possible solution is to curb
the problem of small sample sizes of reported incidents by calcu-
lating numbers in each state over a period of several years. For
example, OSHA could look at a small state's fatality rates instead
of raw fatality numbers, or look at three- to five-year rolling av-
erages to increase sample sizes. Such an analysis may not pro-
duce statistically significant conclusions about a state's enforce-
ment efforts in a particular year, but this approach could yield
valuable insight as to trends over a longer period of time. OSHA
could also tackle the problem of the effect of economic factors,
such as the likelihood of economic slowdown leading to fewer
workplace incidents on fatality numbers by correcting for a quan-
tifiable economic measure like economic growth rates or employ-
ment numbers. OSHA encounters varying industry mixes in the
several states, and it could deal with this patchwork by using pro
rata measures, weighted by industry type, calculated through da-
ta collected in local emphasis program initiatives. That way, if,
for example, one state has a high percentage of employees in
high-hazard construction industries, OSHA could project a higher
number of expected workplace incidents when comparing it to a
state with a predominately low-hazard industry mix. Additional-
ly, OSHA could compensate for the lack of Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics data on workplace injuries and illnesses in ten states by
substituting this data with other reliable measures, such as
workers' compensation claims. Furthermore, OSHA can adapt to
the lack of information regarding the effect of enforcement efforts
on workplace safety and health by requiring state and federal in-
spectors to verify abatement of all serious violations, rather than
just those of the highest severity. This verification would have to
be based on direct evidence, not on the word of the employer. Fi-
nally, OSHA could test a sampling of employers with past report-
ed incidents to determine whether the number of reported inci-
dents reduced over time after the State Plan implemented
inspection or enforcement efforts by the State Plan.
126. Id.
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VI. CONCLUSION
In using procedural criteria to evaluate whether State Plans
are "as effective as" OSHA, OSHA has frustrated partnering
State Plan States and contradicted legislative intent. By shifting
the focus to outcomes in terms of safety and health in the work-
place and by measuring its own effectiveness in comparison,
OSHA can gain new footing with Virginia and other State Plan
States to the benefit of men and women in America's workforce.
$4
